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IN THE SUPREME COURT
O·F THE STATE OF UTAH

IN RE: D\VIGHrr L. KING

No. F-39

Petition for Rehearing
Petitioner in the above-entitled matter hereby petitions this Honorable Court for a rehearing of the review
by this Court of the recommendations of the Board of
Commissioners of the Utah State Bar, and in support of
said petition, states as follows:

1. The Court, in its opinion, overlooked certain material matters which have a direct bearing on the decision.
2. The Court failed to consider and properly apply
the Canons of Ethics of the Utah State Bar and has neglected to consider the Statutes of the State of Utah, spe1
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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cifically Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section 78-51-26,
Subsections 4 and 5.
3. The Court failed to apply the proper principles of
law relating to the quantum of proof necessary to establish the alleged unprofessional conduct of the accused.
4. The Court failed to consider the severity of the
punishment in the light of all facts and circumstances of
this case and particularly the conflicting duties and
dilemma created by the Canons of Ethics of the Utah
State Bar and the Statutes of the State of Utah.
WHEREFORE, petitioner prays that this Honorable Court grant a rehearing in the above-entitled matter so that the material oversights and failures revealed
by the decision heretofore filed may be corrected and the
ends of justice accomplished.
DATED this 22nd day of April, 1958.

~-~

Arthur H. Nielsen
of NIELSEN AND CONDER

510 N ehouse Building, Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Petitioner
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STATEMENT OF POINTS
A careful examination of the opinion of the Court
reveals what petitioner considers to be several basic misunderstandings by the Court concerning the facts and the
legal issues involved. These matters have been segregated
into four main topics for discussion, with some sub-topics,
as follows:
I. l\1a terial rna tters having a direct bearing on the
case which \Vere apparently overlooked by the
Court.
A. Alleged change of position by petitioner.
B. Alleged failure of petitioner to disclose false
testimony until June 21st.
C. The false testimony was on an immaterial
matter.
II. Application of the Canons of Ethics and Statutes
of Utah to the instant matter.
III. Incorrect application by the Court of the law relating to burden of proof.
IV. Severity of the punishment in the light of all the
facts and circumstances.

3
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ARGUMENT
POINT

I.

-yrATERIAL l\IA TTERS HAVING A DIRECT
BEARING ON THE CASE WHICH WERE
APPARENTLY OVERLOOKED BY THE
COURT.
A. ALLEGED CHANGE OF POSITION
BY PETITIONER.
rrhe Court states in its opinion that petitioner
•'changed his position somewhat'' by asserting, when
first investigated, that he considered his duty to his client
to be greater than his duty to the Court to disclose the
false statement and then later at the hearing claimed that
he intended at the first opportunity to disclose the false
statement of his client.
This Court, in making such an observation has apparently failed to take into account that petitioner was talking in reference to different matters so that his position
in this case has not changed. Originally, petitioner was
charged with "knowingly permitting witnesses to fabricate evidence and testify falsely before the District Court
of Davis County." (R. 9). The disciplinary committee
subsequently at the hearing amended its complaint to
include an alleged additional offense of ''knowingly refraining from divulging the truth to the Court or parties
eo11eerning such evidence and testimony.'' (R. 16)
The findings of the disciplinary committee did not
sw~tn in PitlH.'r of the charged grounds. Paragraph Y of
4
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the disciplinary committee's findings were only that petitioner ''did not disclose to the Court or to other counsel true facts as to the place and dates of the execution of
such Waiver of Notice of Directors and Resolution of
Harsh Utah Corporation until June 21, 1954, at a time
when said defendants begin their case in chief at such
trial although Dwight L. I{ing, as Counsel, had opportunity to do so." (R. 280)
The claim that Petitioner knowingly permitted others
to fabricate evidence apparently was abandoned after the
hearing on the matter. As a matter of fact, the Waiver
and Resolution were both proper documents for the officers of Harsh F tah Corporation to prepare. There is no
evidence that these documents do not now constitute a
part of the official record of the corporation, and so, are
not fabricated or false documents.
It is respectfully submitted that it must be kept in
mind that the only offense \Yhich the disciplinary committee found petitioner guilty of was not divulging the
true facts before the 21st day of June, 1954, although
opportunity v,ras present to do so.
\Vhen the disciplinary committee added the second
clause of its charge it then became incumbent upon petioner to meet the assertion that he had not disclosed
the false testimony which originally he was under inYestigation for allegedly assisting in preparing and presenting false false testimony to the Court. When the
Findings of Fact were finally drawn it then became
5
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

incumbent upon petitioner to show that he made a disclosure within a reasonable time.
The facts concerinng the occurrences, both in Davis
County and in the office of petitioner have never been, in
any way, varied nor has there been any change whatsoever in the testimony of the witnesses presented by
petitioner.
Rule 41 of the Canon of Ethics required petitioner
to advise his client, Schnitzer, and the witness, Hutchinson, to rectify the false statement which they made under
oath. The evidence that he did this is uncontradicted.
The second requirement of Rule 41 requires the counsel to advise the Court, or opposing party, of the false
testimony so that any benefit of the false testimony would
be given up.
rrhis Court has heretofore determined specifically
that the false statements of both Hutchinson and
Schnitzer were immaterial to any issue in the case. So,
even if the witnesses, Schnitzer and Hutchinson, had refused to rectify the false statements the only other requirement would have been that petitioner inform the
injured person or counsel and any advantage obtained
would then be given up. No advantage could possibly be
obtained by false testimony on an immaterial matter.
The second requirement of Rule 41, it would seem, is not
<lllplicable.

6
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This Court, in State Y. Hutchinson, 4 U 2d. 404, 295
P. 2d. 345, at page 406, concerning the false testimony
of Hutchinson and Schnitzer, stated as follows:
''They reasoned well since the trial court
found the statements to have been on immaterial
matter with 'vhich conclusion we agree."
B. ALLEGED FAILURE OF PETITIONER TO DISCLOSE FALSE TESrriMONY UNTIL JUNE 21st.
On page 2 of the Opinion of the Court it is stated:
'' rrhere "·as no effort to disclose false testimony on the next Court day which was the following _l\Ionday, nor on Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday or Friday of that week."
This statement is not accurate, nor does it
interpret the evidence which is undisputed.

fairl~·

On June 16th the Court Reporter, J. L. Mays, took
over the reporting duties in the trial of the Harsh Utah
case. Mr. j[ays reported only the 16th and 17th of June,
1954. The 17th of J nne was the Thursday referred to in
the quoted portion of the Court's opinion. On Thursday,
the witness Goddard had taken the stand and Sherman
began to examine him. At that time, the petitioner attempted to stipulate into the record, and did get a partial
stipulation into the record, concerning the false testimony
of Hutchinson and Schnitzer. (Exhibit No. P 2, F. 39,
Page 224.) rrhe attempted stipulation shows the effort of
petitioner to state fairly that the resolution and waiver
were prepared in his office by his secretary upon the

7
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dictation of IIutchinson. It was refused by Sherman
unless petitioner would stipulate that l\Ir. Black and he
v:ere both participants in the preparation of the Waiver
and the Minute. Since such was not the fact an agreeable
stipulation was not made. The statement of Mr. Sherman
indicates that he was not concerned about proving that
the testimony of Schnitzer and Hutchinson was false but
his main purpose was to implicate both Counsel Black
and petitioner in some alleged improper conduct regarding the matter. He said:
''I will continue the examination for the purpose of the record. I would prefer to have it testified to." (Exhibit Xo. P 2 F. 39, page 224.)
The attempted stipulation on June 17th constituted
an effort by petitioner to disclose the facts and it was
completely effective in that it revealed the fact that the
documents had not been prepared in Oregon and could
not, therefore, have been signed at the time Schnitzer and
Hutchinson testified that they were signed.
Even though Counsel for the opposition refused to
allow Petitioner to stipulate the facts on June 17th,
Petitioner caused a complete disclosure of all the facts
surrounding the false testimony to be made on the 21st
day of June when both Schnitzer and Hutchinson testified and withdrew their false statements. The attempted
stipulation on June 17th \Yas an effort by petitioner to
reveal to counsel and the Court that both Hutchinson and
Schnih~er had testified falsely when they stated that the
Resolution and l\1:inute were prepared in Portland and
were sig-11<-'d on April 1st, 1953.

8
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Counsel for the Bar Association in their brief attempt to discredit the actions of petitioner by claiming
that petitioner misrepresented the facts. Actually, as
petitioner stated, he did not remember when the documents were prepared; but the Court Reporter's transcript which records petitioner as stating that the parties
''left'' the office to prepare the documents is an incorrect
reporting of what petitioner said. It is obvious that this
is an error of the reporter since the transcript further
records petitioner as having stated he knew his stenograpter ·was being used to type up the material. Surely
he would not have attempted to claim that Schnitzer and
Hutchinson left the office with the stenographer and later
returned. In the light of the other statements contained
in the record, the only reasonable conclusion to be reached
is that petitioner stated the parties "went to" his office,
rather than ''left.''
The Court, in its decision, places great emphasis on
the number of days which passed before any effort was
made. The amount of time which elapsed between the
false statements and the attempted disclosure of the same
was 7 days, not 11, as stated in the Court's opinion. And
within that 7 days there was a weekend, so that there were
only 5 days of trial time lapsed between the time of the
false testimony and its disclosure by petitioner.
C. THE FALSE TESTI1IONY WAS ON
AN L\I.l\IATERIAL l\1ATTER.
Throughout the Court's opinion the testimony of
Schnitzer and Hutchinson is repeatedly referred to as
9
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perjury. At no place in the majority op1n1on does the
Court state that the perjury was second degree, or disclose that the perjury was on an immaterial matter.
Apparently the Court has overlooked this particular
aspect of the case. The immateriality of the testimony is
now conclusively determined, since this Court, in the case
of State v. I-Iutchinson, supra, determined that the false
statements were on immaterial matters.
Petitioner feels that this failure of the Court's opinion to state in unequivocal language the basic fact that the
perjury committed was second degree and on an immaterial rna tter may be one of the explanations why the
Court did not give the matter of punishment more
consideration.
Another evidence that the immaterial aspect of
the testimony has been overlooked by the Court is found
in the only quoted authority of the main opinion. Thornton, on "Attorneys At Law," Volume 2, page 1235, Section 1822. The quoted statement is applicable only where
an attorney finds that his case is being supported by
perjured testimony. Petitioner ·s case was not being supported by perjured testimony in any way.
The fact that the testimony was on an immaterial
matter has a definite bearing on the action taken by
petitioner. Only by recognizing that no harm or prejudice resulted to anyone by reason of the false statements
of Hutchinson and Schnitzer, can a true perspective of
the action of petitioner be gained.

10
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Throughout the record, and in the original complaint
filed, complainant Sherman accused petitioner of fabricating evidence and participating in the preparation of
false testimony and false documents. On the witness stand
he stated that he had been informed that Schnitzer was
perjuring himself indiscriminately in the litigation. There
was no evidence of any perjury on material or immaterial
matters other than the single instance which is the subject matter of this proceeding.
It would appear, that Sherman, equipped as he was

with his means of eavesdropping during the off Court
hours, and cross-examining during the Court hours,
would uncover any type of false statements, falsification,
or fabrication of documents. Certainly, with his aggressive attitude toward both the opposing parties and their
counsel, any false statements or documents he discovered
would have been made known to the Court.

PoiNT

II.

APPLICATION OF THE CANONS OF ETHICS
AND STATUTES OF UTAH TO THE INSTANT :\IATTER.
The opinion of the Court does not, at any place, discuss the several rules of conduct for attorneys, which
appear to be inconsistent with each other, nor does the
opinion in any way discuss the dilemma into which petitioner was placed by the examination (by Mr. Sherman)
of the party Schnitzer and the witness Hutchinson.
11
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While the court may have considered petitioner was
in a dilemma, it does not appear to have been given any
consideration in the opinion.
The provisions of the rules of conduct, attorneys'
oaths, the statutes of the State of Utah, under circumstances shown by the evidence here, place an attorney in
a dilemma, the solution to which it is respectfully submitted is not as simple as the decision of the Court
indicates.
The attorney's oath contains the following promises
by a counselor at law. This oath is required upon admission to the Bar of the State of Utah:
''I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me such means only as
are consistent with truth and honor and will never
seek to mislead the Judge or Jury by any artifice
or false statement of fact or law.''
''I will maintain the confidence and preserve
inviolate the secrets of my client and will accept
no compensation in connection with his business
except only with his knowledge and approval."
(Exhibit P-7)
Sec. 78-51-26, U.C.A., sets forth the contrasting
duties of an attorney in the following language:
'' 4 ( 4). To employ for the purposes of maintaining the ea n~c~ confided to him such means only
as are consistent with truth and never to seek to
mislead thP judges hy any artifice or false statenwut of fact or la\Y.

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

'' 3. To maintain inviolate the confidences
and at every peril to himself to preserve the
secrets of his client."
rrhe Canons of Ethics which set up and delineate
the conflicts under which a lawyer labors are as follows:
No. 6, 15, 22, 29, 32, 37 and 41. Stated succinctly, these
canons seem to require of the lawyer that he at all times
maintain the confidential communications of his client
and at the same time extend to the Courts of Law full
candor and fairness.
In the day-to-day practice of law there are numerous situations which arise where the conflicting loyalties
of an attorney are the subject of serious concern. Canons
36 and 37 require the attorney to maintain absolute loyalty to his client and to preserve his confidences without fear of any kind as to the consequences to himself.
Canons 15, 22, 29, 32 and 41 require that the lawyer reveal
to the Court any fraud, chicane or false testimony which
is submitted in the course of litigation.
This Court has determined that under the facts and
circumstances of this case as outlined in the decision of
the Court the duty of petitioner to the Court was paramount to his duty to the client. To this determination
petitioner cannot in any way object, but it is respectfully
submitted that the determination by the Court concerning the primary duty of petitioner does not mean that the
primary duty was so clear, unequivocal, or free from
doubt at the time of the trial in Davis County.

13
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The American Bar Association has rendered opinions regarding similar problems which have been presented to the Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances of the American Bar Association by Committees of the State and Local Bar Association. The opinion
most directly in point on the dilemma which faced petitioner is Opinion No. 287, at page 609 of the American
Bar Association Canons of Professional and Judicial
Ethics, Opinions of Committee on Professional Ethics
and Grievance, 1957. The opinion is dated the 27th of
June, 1953, and is entitled: ''Confidential Communications, Candor and Fairness to the Court- Duty of Lawyer on learning of client's perjury in litigation conducted
by him. Conflicting Loyalties under Canons 6 and 37 and
under Canons 15, 22, 29, 32 and 41. ''
The various Canons above mentioned by the American Bar Association opinion are similar in text to the
Canons of the Utah Bar Association as set forth in the
Revised Rules of Utah Bar governing professional conduct and discipline. The numbers correspond to theRevised Rules numbers and, as a consequence, the opinions
are directly in point on the problem which confronted petitioner. Two factual situations are considered, one -where
the attorneys involved learned of the perjury of his client
sometime after the commission of the perjury. The other
fact situation concerned false statements (made in the
presence of the lawyer) by his client to the Court and
\\·hieh, at the time of the making, the attorney knew
vven' false. The Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances determined h~· its majorty opinion that the

14
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duty of the attorney was to respect the confidence of his
client and not to divulge the confidential communication or the confidential information which he had received. The opinion of the majority was concurred in, in
part, and dissented from, in part, by one of the members
of the committee and a dissenting opinion was written
by three members of the Committee. The majority opinion was concurred in by four of the Committee members.
The opinion of this Court is, it is respectfully submitted, similar to the opinion of the minority of the Committee. This Court, in effect, follows the minority opinion of the Committee on Professional Ethics.
The close split between the members of the committee
indicates that the solution to the question of what an
attorney's duty is when a false statement is made by a
client, is not clear or free from doubt.
It is respectfully submitted that an attorney adopting
the majority opinion of the Committee should not be
found to have violated professional ethics. He chose to
keep the confidence of his client rather than adopt the
other horn of the dilemma and immediately disclose the
false testimony amounting to perjury in the second
degree.

The concept of the immediate duty adopted by petitioner is one which is greatly valued in our democratic society. See Communists' Slavery vs. Individual Freedoman address by Charles S. Rhyne, President of the American Bar Association, given on December lOth, 1957, and
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quoted in full in the Utah Bar Bulletin for November and
December, 1957. Mr. Rhyne states, in his address, as
follows:
''Behind the iron curtain we find the most
shocking record in all World history of wholesale
systematic denial, suppression and destruction of
human rights of the individual. In fact, the average citizen, in communist-controlled states, has
few rights. Those he does have are often violated.
Soviet lawyers owe their first duty to the state, not
to their client." (Page 159)
At another point, Mr. Rhyne states as follows:
"The rules of collectives lay down the lawyer's obligation in conducting the defense of the
client. They bluntly stress the fact that his first
obligation is to the State, not the client. During a
criminal trial the defense lawyer is duty bound to
help the prosecution bring out adverse points
against his client." (P. 161)
These quotes, in this brief, are cited for the purpose
of demonstrating to the Court that the choice between the
duty to the Court and the duty to the client is not one which
is easily made or free from doubt. Certainly, petitioner
should not be punished because he honestly conceives his
immediate duty to his client is paramount to his duty to
the Court - even though this Court now holds that he
was in error in so doing.

16
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PoiNT

III.

INCORRECT APPLICATION BY THE COURT
OF THE LAW RELATING TO BURDEN OF
PROOF.
The Court, in its opinion, states as follows:
'' * * * and we are not convinced by any clear
evidence in the record that there was entire good
faith exercised when the disclosure came after,
not before, the falsifiers were caught and exposed,
some 11 days after the perjury and one court day
after it was clearly shown they had perjured
themselves.''

As has been demonstrated, the petitioner made an
effort to disclose the false statements five court days
after they were made, so in this respect, the opinion is in
error.
A more serious objection to the above statement is
that the Court has shifted the burden to the petitioner
to present clear evidence which convinces it of his good
faith.
Of similar import is the weight given by the Court to
the fact that "The matter has been heard by an investigating committee of five, a disciplinary committee of three
and a Board of Commissioners of seven, and there appears to have been no dissent voiced nor any minority
report of any kind filed which would indicate that those
hearing the matter did not join in a unanimous conclusion
that disciplinary action was called for in this case."
The Court appears influenced by this situation notwith17
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standing the provisions of the Statute which put the responsibility upon this Court to determine the guilt or
innocence of the attorney involved. Under Section 78-5118, U.C.A.1953, the Board of Bar Commissioners can only
make recommendations to this Court. Under the provisions of Section 78-51-19, the Supreme Court has the sole
responsibility of finally determining the unprofessional
conduct, if any, of a member of the Bar. Surely it is a
fundamental principle of our government that no person
stands convicted because of suspicion or for failure to
exonerate himself from accusation. In this case Petitioner was accused of assisting in the fabrication of false
testimony. This charge was not sustained, but along the
course of prosecution someone else conceived the idea that
he might be guilty of failing to divulge to the Court that
persons had committed perjury, and he was finally found
guilty of failing to disclose such facts ''within a reasonable time.'' Does this history of the prosecution of this
case demonstrate the unanimity of thinking which this
Court states manifestly appeared to the investigating
committee, hearing committee, and Bar Commission'
Petitioner further desires to point out to the Court
that the report of the original investigating committee
apparently adopted the same philosophy that this Court
adopted when it recommended prosecution because it felt
Mr. King's "explanation is not entirely satisfactory"
(R. 6). If under our democratic processes a person is
to ht• adjudged guilt~, of misconduct because he fails satisfaetorily to explain the same when accused by another
18
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then indeed we are in danger of losing our civil liberties
and our way of life is in jeopardy.
If, as appears from the record, the original investigating committee recommended prosecution of the case
because petitioner failed satisfactorily to explain his conduct regarding the preparation of the documents in question; if the prosecuting committee after endeavoring to
sustain the original charge found it necessary to amend
the complaint because of insufficiency of proof to support
the original charge; if the hearing committee, which did
not agree with either the investigating committee or the
prosecuting committee felt petitioner had not disclosed
the perjury timely to the Court but didn't want the responsibility of prescribing any punishment; if the State
Bar Commission thereafter adopted such finding and recommended disciplinary action in order to support the
action of the hearing committee and because the ultimate
responsibility for final determination was with this Court
then and in such event this Court, by giving weight to the
actions of those who were appointed to seek out the facts,
has inadvertently caused an injustice to be done not only
to petitioner but to the orderly process of the law.
POINT

IV.

SEVERITY OF THE PUNISHMENT IN THE
LIGHT OF ALL THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES.
Finally, petitioner respectfully submits that should
this Court refuse to reconsider its decision it should nev-
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ertheless reduce the punishment which the Bar Association recommended and which this Court has ordered because under all the facts and circumstances attendant in
this case, such punishment is excessive. In the first instance it must be remembered that since the false testimony and the document themselves were immaterial to
any issue in the litigation the disclosure of such falsity
would have had no beneficial effect and its concealment
would have had no detrimental effect on the action. Petitioner's explanation that he avoided an immediate disclosure because of his desire to avoid, if possible, criminal prosecutions against the persons involved, should satisfy this Court that he did not seek to gain or take advantage of the false testimony but only to minimize its harmful effects.
Petitioner has reviewed all of the cases which he has
been able to find concerning disciplinary action of members of the Bar before this Court. In many of the cases
read it would appear that the punishment decreed to the
offending member of the Bar was less severe than that
which the Court has ordered in this case.
The following is a list of the cases, together with the
punishment decreed:
hz re Era1zs & Rogers, 22 U. 366, 6 P. 913.

See Also: In Re Erans, 42 U. 282, 130 P. 217.
Evans & Rogers \Yere accused of champerty and failing to deliver to their clients funds which they had re20
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ceived and to which he was entitled. The Utah Supreme
Court disbarred said attorneys but in a later opinion
rendered many years later the disbarment was set aside
and the Court acknowledged that a great miscarriage of
justice had been perpetrated. As in the case at bar the
disbarment arose out of a heated lawsuit and one in
which disagreement between counsel representing the
various parties seemed to be the basic seed which caused
the complaint and proceeding against Evans & Rogers.
In rc Foxley, 61 U. 575, 217 P. 248. The attorney was
convicted of embezzlement. This Court ordered disbarment.
In re Hilton, 48 U. 172, 158 P. 691. Hilton was convicted of falsely stating, both publicly and privately, that
the Utah Supreme Court was under the control and influence of the Mormon Church and was ordered
disbarred.
In re Hanson, 48 U. 163, 158 P. 778. This proceed-

ing involved Attorney Willard Hanson. He was caught
by the Police Department of Salt Lake City while taking
certain clothing from the department belonging to the defendant whom he represented and who was charged with
the crime of murder. It appeared that the Court believed
the Attorney had taken the clothing for the purpose of destroying them or concealing them from the State's prosecuting authority. Discipline ordered was sixty days' suspension to run from the 1st day of July to the 31st day
of August.
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In re Barclay, 82 U. 288, 24 P. 2d 302, Barclay was
accused of withholding funds belonging to his client. The
Bar recommended six months' suspension. This Court reduced it to three months upon a showing that during the
proceedings Barclay had restored to his client the moneys
which he was accused of withholding.
In re Stephenson, 85 U. 380, 39 P. 2d 722. Stephenson was accused of withholding funds collected on behalf
of his client, and was ordered that he be suspended from
practive for a period of three months.
In re McCullough, 97 U. 533,95 P. 2d 13. ~IcCullough
was accused of soliciting legal actions and withholding
information concerning the whereabouts of a defendant
who was released to his custody and whom he advised to
leave the State of Utah to escape prosecution. Recommended punishment two years' suspension was reduced
by this Court to nine months' suspension.
In re Pearce, 103 U. 522, 137 P. 2d 969. Pearce was
convicted of an indictable misdemeanor involving a conspiring to operate houses of ill fame. On the basis of this
conviction he was disbarred.
In re Norton, 106 U. 179, 146 P. 2d 899. Norton falsely represented to this Court that a certain offered Exhibit
had been rPrPived by the trial court when, in fact, it had
not been received but had been rejected. The Court, one
discovers from the opinion, believed not only that Norton
falsely represented the status of Exhibit I, but also that
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the Exhibit sheets in the case had been altered to show
the receipt of the exhibit and that the alterations were
probably accomplished by Norton. Ordered one year suspension.
The evidence in this case shows petitioner was only
guilty of failing to reveal false statements concerning immaterial matters during the time the opposing party was
presenting his case. This Court has determined this violates professional ethics. The violation, it is respectfully
submtted, was an innocent mistake made because the petitioner erroneously believed he owed a duty to his client
to wait for an opportune time before making a disclosure
to the Court or correcting the record. Punishment certainly should not approach that given for wrongfully
appropriating clients' funds or attempting to destroy
State's evidence in a murder case.
The Court should further consider the fact that the
matter complained of occurred in June 1954. Since August 6, 1954, when the complainant Sherman wrote to the
Utah State Bar lodging a "formal complaint," petitioner
has been under investigation and subjected to considerable mental pressure, as well as adverse publicity. The
stigma attached to such proceedings, as well as to the
Order of the Court finding petitioner to be guilty of unprofessional conduct, has been and is sufficient, under the
facts and circumstances of this case, to satisfy the Court
that the ends of justice have been accomplished.
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CONCLUSION
Petitioner respectfully submits that the Court should
grant a rehearing for the purpose of reviewing and considering the matters raise dherein, or at all events the
Order in respect to the punishment should be amended so
as to eliminate any suspension or reduce the time thereof.
Respectfully submitted,
ARTHUR H. NIELSEN
510 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Petitioner
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